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Abstract. The paper examines the impact of nomination committee attributes on the 
performance of finance companies in Malaysia. Our panel data is composed of annual data 
for finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia over the period 2004 to 
2011. The result indicates that finance expertise of directors’ on nomination committee 
influences accounting returns positively while membership of executive on nomination 
committee affects accounting returns negatively. This indicates that the requirement of 
Bank Negara that nomination committee should be composed of non-executive directors is 
appropriate and suggests that the regulators should recommend companies to include 
directors with finance expertise in the nomination committee in future policy formulation. 
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1. Introduction 
he recent slow-down in world economy which resulted from the global 
financial crisis has affected economies in several ways (Atik, 2009). 
Diverging opinions have been given about the reasons for the occurrence of 
the recent financial crisis. Among the possible reasons for the crisis includes the 
diversification of finance companies into non-traditional financial services, US 
subprime crisis, government guarantee and financial innovations which have led to 
the emergence of new and highly complex financial products (Moosa, 2008). 
Evidence from literature have suggested that the board of directors contributed to 
the crisis due to poor monitoring by its monitoring subcommittees which enabled 
the management of firms to engage in non-value adding activities which led to 
adverse effect on firm performance (Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, 2008). Aftermath of 
the crisis has further indicated the importance of good corporate governance 
practices in finance companies.  
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the crisis and the eventual fall or 
bankruptcies of many giant financial institutions, recession and economic problems 
in some countries especially in the West (Becht, Bolton & Roell, 2011).In order to 
save the troubled companies, protect the financial system and the entire economy, 
authorities intervene with various rescue packages to save the troubled companies. 
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This led to the injection of the public funds into such institutions to prevent total 
collapse of the system. Furthermore, authorities instituted committees to look into 
the reasons behind such problems and to come out with recommendations that have 
become laws and regulations to guide the governance of financial institutions. 
Some recommendations of these committees include the enhancement of the 
functions of the monitoring committees. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, 
the corporate scandals in different parts of the world and the recent financial crisis 
has affected the performance of finance companies and motivated the research and 
interest in corporate governance of such companies.  
Finance companies play an important role in economic activities of developing 
countries. They serve as a source of capital to start a business, source of credit to 
purchase homes, cars and other consumer durables and serve as a secure place for 
the safekeeping of people’s assets (Sufian & Habibullah, 2010). As a result of their 
importance, regulatory agencies provide strict supervision to ensure that the 
companies are governed well to safeguard the financial system and ensure that the 
companies fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. The finance companies contribute 
to the development of the financial system and overall economic growth through 
their roles in the economy which includes monitoring of other companies, 
identification of profitable investment projects and mobilizing funds which 
facilitates trade and investment (Ferreira, 2008). Finance companies are the most 
vulnerable business organization in all economies all over the world due to their 
central role in an economy (Soomro, Gilal & Jatoi, 2011). They facilitate and 
influence various economic activities which include poverty elimination and 
resource allocation among others. The finance sector is very important due to the 
level of investment of the government in the sector, its contribution to the economy 
through contribution to the GDP and the importance of the sector in terms of 
implementation of government economic policies and programmes aimed at 
developing specific sector of the economy (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). This shows the 
significance of good governance in finance companies to the government. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 and prior corporate scandals affected 
investors’ confidence in capital market and necessitated the move to enhance the 
corporate governance practice by companies in Malaysia. This move started with 
the setting up of a finance committee on corporate governance to deal with the 
issue of establishing codes and principles to guide the companies (Ghazali, 2010). 
One of the outcomes of the committee was the introduction of the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance in March 2000. The finance committee also established 
the Malaysian institute of corporate governance which operates as a nonprofit 
public company limited by guarantee. This move was aimed at restoring 
confidence of investors in capital market. Compliance with the codes developed 
from this initiative was initially voluntary but later made mandatory by the revised 
listing requirements of Bursa Malaysia in 2001. The main aim of the first version 
of the Code was to establish governance structures and processes for the effective 
running of companies. Such structures and processes include board composition, 
recruitment and remuneration of directors and the establishment of board 
subcommittees (Securities Commission Malaysia, n.d.). Since coming into 
existence, the Code has been revised twice in 2007 and 2012 to enhance its 
significance and make it in line with the changing needs of the market.  
The revision to the Code in October 2007 was done to improve the quality of 
the board of public listed companies (PLCs) by emphasizing on the enhancement 
of the role of board of directors, stipulating the role of nomination committee (NC) 
and qualification required for people to be appointed as directors and strengthening 
the audit committee (AC). The second revision issued in March 2012 was aimed at 
‘strengthening board structure and composition, recognizing the role of directors 
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as active and responsible fiduciaries’ (MCCG, 2012, p.1). It provides 
recommendations for best practices of corporate governance and its 
recommendations serve as a general guide for listed companies in Malaysia. The 
revised Code was aimed at enhancing board effectiveness through board leadership 
and independence. As could be observed from the above discussion the MCCG 
was issued and revised in order to ensure that companies have governance 
mechanisms that are capable of safeguarding the interest of various stakeholders 
especially in finance companies where there is high agency problem coupled with 
complex operations, structures and products. This has shown the commitment of 
the SCM in ensuring sound capital market which will enhance the confidence of 
investors in the market and attract more capital into the market and ensure that 
Malaysia remains one of the best destinations for foreign capital. 
Despite the important role nomination committee plays and the impact of its 
attributes on its performance and performance of the board and the company at 
large, few studies have examined the impact of nomination committee attributes on 
firm performance especially in finance companies of a developing nation (Carcello, 
Hermanson & Ye, 2011). Hence, the study of the relationship between nomination 
committee attributes and performance of finance companies is significant because 
it will highlight the characteristics of the committee that enhance the effective 
monitoring of a firm by the board of directors. Thus, this study examines the 
attributes of NC which have influence on the performance of finance companies in 
Malaysia. The main objective of the paper is to determine the impact of nomination 
committee attributes on the performance of finance companies in Malaysia and to 
examine such impact in the period before and after the Malaysian code on 
corporate governance (MCCG) was revised. The study provides empirical evidence 
on the impact of nomination subcommitteeon the performance of finance 
companies and compares the period before and after the revision to the MCCG.  
Unlike prior studies, this study provides evidence on the impact of governance 
mechanisms on the performance of finance companies as a whole and not limited 
to banking segment of the financial sector thereby including other segments such as 
insurance which are usually excluded in prior studies. In terms of practical 
significance, the study provides regulatory authorities with an insight into the 
nomination subcommittee attributes that influence performance and improves 
investors’ confidence in finance companies. The result of the studyprovides 
regulators with empirical evidence on the nomination committee attributes that 
enhances performance in finance companies so that the regulators will include 
them in future policy formulation so that the confidence of the investors in 
companies will be restored or enhanced. The study would enable directors to 
improve their monitoring functions through enhanced functioning of the various 
monitoring subcommittees by enhancing the composition of the subcommittees. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 explains the research methodology. Section 
4 presents the result from empirical analyses. Section 5 contains result from 
analysis to address potential endogeneity problem while section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
Agency relationship according to Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) ‘is a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal (s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some services on behalf of the principal which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent’. Agency 
relationship results from the separation of ownership and control which was 
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brought by the industrial revolution that led to the emergence of large organizations 
and therefore the delegation of responsibility and authority (Berle & Means, 1932). 
The shareholders as principals appoint agents to manage the business on their 
behalf and this separation of ownership and control could result into the agents 
taking decisions that are not in the interest of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In addition, the separation of ownership and control could create further 
problems in firms especially finance companies due to the diverse interests of 
different stakeholders in finance companies which include investors, shareholders, 
depositors and the agents (Bhandari, 2010).  
This delegation of decision making to the agents may bring problems in the 
relationship as a result of the difference in the interest of the principals and the 
agents and decision taken by the agents and those that will promote the interest of 
the principals. The theory suggests that the principal can reduce the problem that 
could arise due to divergence of interest of the agent and the principal by 
monitoring the agent. These monitoring mechanisms that are put in place in firms 
include corporate governance mechanisms such as board and board subcommittees 
(Ntim, 2009). These mechanisms provide monitoring to prevent or reduce the 
opportunistic behaviour of the agent in companies which results from information 
asymmetry problem, difference in objectives and the difference in risk appetite of 
the principal and agent (Boyd, Haynes & Zona, 2011). The agent may engage in 
self-interest activities which will reduce the wealth of the principals (Cuevas-
Rodriquez, Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2012). 
The stewardship theory is based on the assumption that managers are concerned 
about the welfare of the owners and overall performance of the company and this 
contradicts agency theory which believes that agents are self-centered and 
individualistic (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  The theory suggests that managers will 
work hard towards the attainment of the goal of owners (Boyd et al., 2011). Based 
on assumptions of stewardship theory, Ntim (2009) argued that firm performance 
will be enhanced if the executive have more powers and are trusted to run the firm. 
The theory believes that the combination of board chair and CEO will increase 
effectiveness and produce superior result than the separation of the roles (Al 
Mamun et al., 2013). A study by Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that a 
company that has unitary leadership structure has better performance which is 
depicted by an improvement in the return on equity compared to another company 
that separates the two functions. This could be as a result of lack of conflict in 
position of responsibility and authority which could result if the two roles are 
separated. 
Stewardship theory assumes that the steward is capable of unifying the different 
interests of stakeholders and that the steward willingly act in a way that will protect 
the interest and welfare of others (Hernandez, 2012). In other words, the theory 
assumes that the actions of the steward are aimed at protecting the long term 
welfare of the principal. He also added that the theory assumes that people are 
motivated to perform their work by the intrinsic reward they derive from their jobs. 
Thus, the nature of the reward is different from the agency theory where the focus 
of the reward to managers is extrinsic in nature. In line with the assumptions of 
stewardship theory, evidence from empirical studies have shown that presence of 
executive directors on the board and board subcommittees will enhance 
performance of companies as a result of the technical knowledge and information 
advantage of the inside directors (Ntim, 2009). In the context of finance firms, and 
based on the assumptions of the stewardship theory, the inside directors will be 
able to contribute more in decisions of board subcommittees due to their technical 
expertise, experience and knowledge about the company and the finance industry. 
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The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2007) requires board to have 
Nomination committees. The Bank Negara corporate governance guide (2013) 
requires the NC to be composed of five members with at least four non-executive 
directors with an independent chair. The committee is responsible for assessing the 
performance of directors on a continuous basis, assessing skills, experience and 
competencies needed by the board and proposing new nominees to the board 
(MCCG, 2007). Kaczmarek, Kimino & Pye (2012) examined the influence of NC 
on board diversity based on a sample of FTSE300 firms from 1999 to 2008 and 
reported that increasing the diversity of NC is likely to increase the diversity of 
board and that presence of CEO on the NC will have an influence on NC 
independence. The NC ensures that the board is composed in such a way that it will 
be able to perform its duties appropriately (Kaczmarek et al., 2012). Although, the 
NC is responsible for selecting people to be appointed to the board, sometimes the 
appointment is made based on the recommendations of the CEO, thus, a powerful 
CEO can influence appointments to the board (Pearce & Zahra, 1991). Carcello et 
al. (2011b) found that the benefit of having independent and expert directors on 
audit committee is absent when the CEO is involved in director selection. 
Involvement of the CEO in the appointment of directors will affect the 
independence and effective monitoring of the board and its committees since there 
is high probability that the CEO will support the appointment of only those who 
will promote his interest (Carson, 2002). This CEO influence is highly likely in 
firms where the CEO is on NC and in NC dominated by inside directors 
(Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). 
Carson (2002) examined factors that determine the formation of board 
subcommittees based on a sample of 361 Australian firms. The results indicate that 
the formation of board subcommittees is determined by presence of big 6 audit 
firms, non-executive directors chairman and ownership structure. Eminet & Guedri 
(2010) examined the impact of NC existence and NC independence on the rewards 
and sanctions given to the directors by the labour market for being active monitors 
on a sample of 200 public firms in France. The results indicate that the directors’ 
subsequent appointment to a nomination committee dominated by independent 
directors which also excludes the CEO is influenced by the director’s reputation in 
actively monitoring the management. Thus, independence of NC will enhance 
transparency in the process of director selection and enhances independence of the 
board as a whole and its decisions. The presence of independent directors on the 
NC will ensure highly qualified directors are selected and ensure enhanced 
monitoring of the management (Yeh, et al., 2011). In addition, the independence of 
the various subcommittees, the board and the overall firm performance is enhanced 
by the presence of more independent directors on the NC because their presence 
will prevent the management from dominating the board which is possible by 
dominating the process of appointing new directors (Carcello et al., 2011).    
According to Jiraporn, Manohar & Lee (2009) the effectiveness of the board in 
performing its functions is enhanced when the board has subcommittee. The 
committee of the board includes operating committees which advice the 
management on matters relating to day to day operations of the company and the 
monitoring committee which monitor the activities of the company in order to 
ensure that the interest of various stakeholders are protected (Harrison, 1987). 
From agency theory perspective, the presence of independent nomination 
committee will ensure that quality directors are appointed to the board and board 
subcommittees (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009). The establishment of 
nomination committee was not common among Malaysian companies before the 
MCCG was issued. However, after the MCCG was issued, the number of board 
subcommittees has increased from the time when only audit committee was in 
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existence to present situation where we have other monitoring committees such as 
nomination, remuneration and risk management committee (Harrison, 1987). The 
establishment of subcommittee is a requirement for most corporate governance 
codes or guideline given by regulators such as stock exchange and Central Bank. 
One important feature of most of these committees that made them very important 
is the presence of outside directors on such committees. According to Ntim (2009) 
the presence of board committees has no impact on performance of companies in 
South Africa except nomination committee (NC). 
Board subcommittees are very important monitoring mechanism because one of 
the ways shareholders can control management is through the choice of board and 
committee structure (Chhaochcharia, Kumar & Ruenzi, 2012).The corporate 
governance guidance issued by Central bank requires all licensed financial 
institutions to have a nomination committee which is saddled with the 
responsibility for the selection and appointment of directors and CEO and for the 
continuous evaluation of the performance of CEO and the effectiveness of each 
director and the board as a whole. The guide requires that the committee should be 
composed of a minimum of five members for all licensed companies except money 
broking firms, four of whom must be non-executive and chaired by independent 
director. The committee is responsiblefor establishing requirements for board, 
recommending and assessing nominees for board appointment, overseeing the 
composition of the board and recommending the removal of a director, CEO or 
management as a result of ineffectiveness.  
Based on the recommendation of Bursa Malaysia, board of directors is required 
to have a nomination committee (NC) composed mainly of non-executive directors 
with majority INEDs. The committee is responsible for assessing the performance 
of directors on a continuous basis, assessing skills, experience and competencies 
needed by the board and proposing new nominees to the board (MCCG, 2007). 
Although, the NC is responsible for choosing people to be appointed to the board, 
sometimes the appointment is made based on the recommendations of the CEO. 
Thus, powerful CEO can influence appointments to the board (Pearce & Zahra, 
1991). This depends on how powerful the CEO is and power of the CEO could be 
determined by the time he spent in that position, his shareholding in the company 
and whether he is part of the founding family of the company. 
This involvement of the CEO in the appointment of directors will affect the 
independence and effective monitoring of the board since there is high probability 
that the CEO will support the appointment of only those who will promote his 
interest. This CEO influence in the selection of directors is highly likely in 
companies where the CEO is a member of the NC, in companies with small board 
and in boards dominated by inside directors (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). 
Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2009) found that board committee has a positive impact 
on firm performance. Vefeas (1999) reports that subcommittees have a negative 
impact on firm performance due to the extra cost to be incurred in the form of 
meeting allowance, travel cost and directors time. In addition, Klein (1998), Vefeas 
& Theodorou (1998) and Bozec (2005) all found no relationship between 
monitoring committees and firm performance. Prior empirical studies (such as Yeh, 
Chung & Liu, 2011; Carson, 2002; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999; Patton & Baker, 
1987) have also reported the impact NC attributes could have on its performance 
and performance of the board, subcommittees and the company as a whole. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Independence of NC will enhance the transparency in the process of director 
selection and enhances independence of the board as a whole and its decisions 
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(Ntim, 2009).Independence is important in enhancing the role of nomination 
committee in identifying competent directors and reviewing performance of the 
directors. If the executive have influence over the selection of a director, effective 
discharge of the functions or monitoring role of the board and its committees could 
be hampered since the directors may be obliged to protect the interest of those who 
supported their appointments (Carson, 2002). The nomination committee will 
ensure that highly qualified and independent directors are appointed to the board 
(Carson, 2002). Vefeas, (1999) reported that the existence of nomination 
committee has a positive impact on the quality of new directors appointed to the 
board. This implies that NC improves the quality of the board and its committees 
which ultimately enhances firm performance. Thus, the following hypothesis was 
tested:  
H1 There is a positive relationship between nomination subcommittee 
with independent directors and performance of finance companies.     
The involvement of CEO in director selection removes the importance of 
independence and expertise of directors in effectively discharging their oversight 
functions (Carcello et al., 2011).  Furthermore, where the CEO is involved in 
director selection, the presence of AC with independent and expert directors will 
not ensure the provision of quality accounting information and will not reduce the 
incidence of accounting restatements. Therefore, the presence of independent 
directoras committee chair on the NC will ensure that the committee is 
independent, enhances the ability of the committee to resist CEO influence in 
director selection, ensure that highly qualified management are selected and 
ensures enhanced monitoring of the management (Yeh, et al., 2011). The 
independence of the various subcommittees, the board and the overall firm 
performance is enhanced by the presence of independent chair on the NC because 
his presence will prevent the management from dominating the board which is 
usually possible by dominating the process of appointing new directors to the board 
(Patton & Baker, 1987). Thus, we hypothesized as follows; 
H2 There is a positive relationship between independent chair of 
nomination subcommittee and performance of a finance company. 
The expertise of directors enhances the ability of directors in nominating 
competent directors to the board and in discharging their oversight functions 
effectively (Carcello et al., 2011). Raber (2003) and Dionne & Triki (2005) 
reported that the ability of the directors to perform their functions on the board and 
board committeesdepends on their expertize. The complex nature of the operations 
and products of the finance companies requires directors with technical expertise to 
be appointed to board committees to provide efficient monitoring. This could be 
enhanced if the directors in charge of the selection are expert in the field so that 
they will be able to identify qualified candidates for appointment to the board and 
its various committees. Therefore, we hypothesized as follows; 
H3 There is a positive relationship between nomination subcommittees’ 
expertise and performance of finance companies. 
The directors on NC need to have experience in order to provide effective 
monitoring and to be able to evaluate the activities and performance of the board, 
CEO and individual director. Akhigbe & Martin (2006) and Tao & Hutchinson 
(2012) found that experience of directors enhances their monitoring ability. This is 
due to the complex nature of the products, services and operations of finance 
companies which requiressome expertise or experience to ensure directors provide 
adequate monitoring. The following relationship was hypothesized; 
 H4 There is a positive relationship between presence of NED with 
executive experience on nomination subcommittee and performance of 
finance companies.  
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Carcello et al., (2011) found that the presence of executive especially the CEO 
on nomination committee may affect the effectiveness of the directors in 
monitoring the management even if the directors are independent and have the 
required expertise. On the contrary, the presence of executive on the committee 
will provide the committee with inside information that may help thecommittee in 
its monitoring activities and enhance company performance (Tao & Hutchinson, 
2012). In another perspective, Klein (1998) found that companies that increased the 
number of executive directors on board committees had an increase in the return on 
their investments. The following hypothesis was tested;   
H5 There is a positive relationship between membership of executive on 
nomination subcommittee and performance of finance companies.  
 
4. Methodology 
The study used panel data of 37 finance companies listed on the main market 
segment of the Bursa Malaysia. The companies in the sample comprised of 
companies in different segments of the finance sector. The observation period 
covers period from 2004 to 2011. The data includes both data on committee 
attributes and financial data. The information on the committee attributes was 
manually extracted from the annual report of companies obtained from the website 
of Bursa Malaysia or website of the individual company. Financial data was 
obtained from Bloomberg database. Multiple regression analysis was used to 
analyze the data. 
In order to control for omitted variable bias, size is added as a control variable 
since prior studies have shown that size of a firm could determine its profitability 
due to the ability of large finance companies to make provision for non-performing 
loans, ability to increase customers through advertising and ability to hire 
experienced and highly skilled workers which could lead to enhanced profitability 
(Garcia-Herrero, Gavila & Santabarbara, 2009). The hypotheses outlined above 
were tested using the following regression model; 
 
Fpit = α + β1 CCit + β2 CINEDit+ β3 FEit+ 
β4 EEit +β5 EPEit + β6 FSit + β7 LEVit+ YD + εit 
 
The variables in the research model were measured as follows: 
FP=  Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.  
CC= proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on 
the subcommittee 
CINED= dummy variable of one if the subcommittee chair is independent 
director zero otherwise 
FE= proportion of directors with accounting qualification on the 
subcommittee  
EE= proportion of directors with executive experience on the 
subcommittee 
EP= proportion of executive on the committee 
FS=  Log of total assets 
LEV=  Ratio of total debt to total equities 
 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
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The results of the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 blow indicates that 
the data is normally distributed since the values for all the variables except 
executive membership of committee are normally distributed. The independence of 
the NC members ranges from a committee with no INED to a committee with 
100% INEDs. The results also indicate that 82% of the companies have NC with 
independent chair. Finance expertise and executive experience of directors’ range 
from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 100% with an average of 28% and 25% 
for expertise and experience respectively. Furthermore, membership of executive 
on the committee range from a committee with no executive, to a committee 
composed of 20% executive directors with an average of 1%. 
 
Table 1. Result of descriptive statistics 
 ROA TQ CC CINED FE EE EP FS LEV 
Mean  0.024  0.008  0.613  0.829  0.282  0.256  0.012  0.042  0.064 
Median   0.014  0.010  0.600  1.000  0.200  0.200  0.000  0.036  0.037 
Maximum  0.130  0.013  1.000  3.000  1.000  1.000  0.200  0.088  0.310 
Minimum -0.048  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.025  0.002 
Std. Dev.  0.028  0.004  0.327  0.423  0.265  0.287  0.049  0.012  0.062 
Skewness  1.411 -1.395 -0.721 -0.504  0.613  0.889  3.533  0.731  1.417 
Kurtosis  5.327  3.041  2.540  7.011  2.421  2.773  13.48  2.685  5.197 
Notes: ROA=return on assets measured as PBT divided by total assets, CC=committee composition 
defined as the proportion of Independent directors to total number of directors on NC, CINED=chair 
independent non-executive director defined as a dummy variable that takes one if committee chair is 
independent zero otherwise, FE=finance expertise measured as the number of directors with 
accounting expertise or finance industry experience divided by the total number of directors on NC, 
EE=executive experience measured as the number of directors with executive experience divided by 
the total number of directors on NC, EP=membership of executive defined as the number of executive 
directors on NC divided by total number of directors on NC, FS=firm size (log of total assets), LEV= 
leverage measured as total debt divided by equity. 
 
The result of correlation analysis presented in Table 2 indicates no 
multicollinearity problem since none of the bivariate correlation is equal to or 
greater than 0.9. The linearity assumption is also fulfilled since the values obtained 
are within the ±3.00 threshold. The test of heteroskedasticity indicates the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity problem is supported when ROA is used as the 
predicted variable while the hypothesis is rejected when Tobin’s Q was used. The 
white heteroskedasticity consistent standard error was used to correct the problem. 
The results also indicated autocorrelation problem in the models. The problem was 
addressed by using white diagonal method. 
 
Table 2. Summary of correlation analysis 
 ROA TQ INED CINED FE EE EP FS LEV 
ROA  1.000 -0.074 -0.074 -0.189  0.034 -0.170 -0.148  0.112 -0.407 
TBQ -0.074  1.000 -0.112 -0.063  0.088 -0.168  0.080  0.171 -0.106 
INED -0.074 -0.112  1.000  0.537  0.555  0.243 -0.065 -0.264  0.311 
CINED -0.189 -0.063  0.537  1.000  0.387  0.243 -0.002 -0.255  0.201 
FE  0.034  0.088  0.555  0.387  1.000  0.371 -0.041 -0.101  0.092 
EE -0.170 -0.168  0.243  0.243  0.371  1.000  0.077 -0.034  0.120 
EP -0.148  0.080 -0.065 -0.002 -0.041  0.077  1.000  0.136  0.096 
FS  0.112  0.171 -0.264 -0.255 -0.101 -0.034  0.136  1.000  0.053 
LEV -0.407 -0.106  0.311  0.201  0.092  0.120  0.096  0.053  1.000 
 Notes: ROA=return on assets, TQ=Tobin’s Q ratio, INED=independent non-executive directors, 
CINED=chair independent non-executive director, FE=finance experience, EE=executive experience, 
EP=membership of executive, FS=firm size, LEV=leverage. 
 
5.2. Multivariate regression analysis based on ROA 
The results of Hausman’s test indicated that REM was the most appropriate 
method to use for this model. The adjusted R
2
 of 0.137 implies that the variables 
collectively explain approximately 13% of the variation in firm performance. The 
f-statistics (3.654) was large and the corresponding p-value was highly significant 
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(p<0.01) or lower than the alpha value of 0.01. This indicate that the slope of the 
estimated least squares regression model line is not equal to zero confirming that 
the research data fits the proposed seven predictor model of the study.  As shown 
by the result presented in Table 3 below and based on REM only three variables 
were significant in explaining accounting returns. Leverage made the largest single 
contribution in explaining the dependent variable (ROA) with a coefficient 
contribution of -0.168 and a corresponding t-statistics of -3.341. It suggests that 
one standard deviation change in leverage is followed by -0.168 standard deviation 
change in performance. 
We predicted a significant relationship between expertise of directors on NC 
and firm performance. The results obtained indicate a significant positive 
relationship between expertise of directors on NC and firm performance. 
Empirically, the results is in line with evidence reported by Defond, Hann & Hu 
(2005), Sharma, Naiker & Lee (2009) and Aldamen et al., (2012). By contrast, the 
positive sign does not support evidence from Knapp (1987) and Cohen, 
Krisnamoorthy & Wright (2002) who reported that expertise of directors on a 
subcommittee does not affect performance since lack of expertise of the directors 
will be compensated when the service is outsourced to external party. Hypothesis 5 
predicted a significant relationship between executive membership of NC and 
ROA. The significant negative relationship (p<0.1) indicated by the result is in line 
with agency theory and supports results reported by prior studies such as 
Shivdasani & Yermack (1999) who argued that executive membership of NC will 
enable them to influence director selection. Leverage is significantly negatively 
related with ROA while the remaining variables were insignificant. 
 
Table 3. Summary of multivariate regression analysis based on ROA 
  Pooled (OLS)  REM  FEM 
Constant  0.028(2.242)**  0.033(2.770)***  0.029(1.677)* 
Committee composition  0.008(0.655) -0.008(-0.721) -0.011(-0.840) 
CINED -0.021(-2.056)** -0.011(-1.437) -0.007(-1.072) 
Finance expertise  0.019(1.541)  0.031(1.946)*  0.041(1.636) 
Executive experience -0.0007(-0.107) -0.001(-0.178) -0.003(-0.265) 
Executive presence -0.086(-3.894)*** -0.077(-2.824)*** -0.068(-1.914)* 
Firm size  0.329(1.998)**  0.161(0.980)  0.146(0.847) 
Leverage -0.200(-5.742)*** -0.168(-3.341)*** -0.138(-2.045)** 
Year dummy  0.016(2.335)**  0.014(2.850)***  0.013(2.770)*** 
Year dummy  0.000(0.120) -0.001(-0.315) -0.003(-0.510) 
Year dummy  0.002(0.462)  0.000(0.217)  7.03(0.018) 
Year dummy  0.002(0.393)  0.001(0.419)  0.001(0.303) 
R squared  0.277  0.189  0.708 
Adjusted R squared  0.230  0.137  0.607 
F-statistics  5.990***  3.654***  7.020*** 
Hausman’s test NA  8.412(0.675)  NA 
Durbin Watson stat  0.996  1.829  2.313 
Notes: Coefficient in front and t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. OLS=ordinary least square, REM=random effect method, FEM=fixed effect 
method, 2007 is used as the base year.ROA=return on assets, TQ=Tobin’s Q, CC=committee 
composition, CINED=chair independent non-executive director, FE=finance expertise, EE=executive 
experience, EP=executive membership, FS=firm size, LEV=leverage. 
 
5.3. Results of regression analysis based on Tobin’s Q 
The results of Hausman’s test indicated that REM was the most appropriate 
method to use. The adjusted R
2
 of 0.0907 implies that the variables collectively 
explained 9.1% of the variation in firm performance. The f-statistics (2.479) was 
large and the corresponding p-value was highly significant (p<0.01) or lower than 
the alpha value of 0.01. This indicates that the slope of the estimated least squares 
regression model line is not equal to zero confirming that the research data fits the 
proposed seven predictor model of the study. Firm size made the largest 
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contribution in explaining the dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) the coefficient 
obtained was 0.040 with a corresponding t-statistics of 1.743.  
It suggests that one standard deviation increase in leverage is followed by 0.040 
standard deviation change in performance. However, none of the committee 
attributes has a significant relationship with firm performance. The control variable 
firm size shows a significant (p<0.10) positive association with firm performance. 
This could be explained by the availability of more resources to the company and 
because of the extra monitoring by the different stakeholders who are interested in 
the activities of the company.   
 
Table 4. Results of multivariate regression analysis based on Tobin’s Q ratio 
 Pooled (OLS) REM FEM 
Constant  0.006(4.654)***  0.007(5.024)***  0.010(4.336)*** 
Composition -0.001(-1.284) -0.001(-0.866) -0.003(-1.215) 
Chair independent -0.000(-0.350) -0.000(-0.379) -0.000(-0.949) 
Finance expertise  0.003(2.602)**  0.001(0.798) -0.002(-0.628) 
Executive experience -0.002(-2.117)** -0.001(-1.227) -0.001(-0.61) 
Executive presence  0.006(1.084)  9.71(0.017) -0.007(-0.775) 
Firm size  0.032(1.318)  0.040(1.743)*  0.031(1.240) 
Leverage -0.003(-0.767) -0.008(-1.279) -0.016(-2.144)** 
Year dummy  0.002(2.862)***  4.29(0.0457)  0.000(0.217) 
Year dummy  0.001(1.303)  0.002(4.020)***  0.002(3.879)*** 
Year dummy  0.001(1.486)  0.001(1.529)  0.001(1.823)* 
Year dummy  0.000(0.287)  0.001(1.506)  0.001(1.762)* 
R squared  0.149  0.152  0.569 
Adjusted R2  0.087 0.090  0.405 
F-statistics 2.423*** 2.479*** 3.471*** 
Durbin Watson stat 1.039 1.545 1.973 
Hausman’s test NA 12.997(0.293) NA 
Notes: coefficient in first row and t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. OLS=ordinary least square, REM=random effect method, FEM=fixed effect 
method. 
 
5.4. Comparison of the results of statistical analyses for the period before 
and after the revision to MCCG 
In this section and based on data obtain for three years (2004 to 2006) before 
and three years after (2009 to 2011) the MCCG was revised, we compared the 
result of statistical analyses for the period before and after the revision to MCCG. 
The composition of NC range from a maximum of 100% to a minimum of zero 
with an average of 28% and 64% for the period before and after the revision 
respectively. The result further shows that 58% and 81% of the NC have 
independent chair in the period before and after the revision. This depicts an 
improvement in the independence of the NC which will enable the committee to 
perform its role properly which was one of the aims of the revision to the code.  
In contrast, the maximum value for expert directors on NC is 100% with a 
minimum of zero and an average of 38% and 28% for the period before and after 
respectively. This shows that less expert directors were appointed to the NC. The 
maximum value for the directors with executive experience is 66% and 100 with an 
average of 4% and 28% for the period before and after the revision. The maximum 
proportion of executive directors on NC is 100% with a minimum of zero and an 
average of 37% and 0.7% for the period before and after the revision. This 
indicates that the companies have responded positively to the requirements of the 
revised code by reducing the number of executive directors on the NC.    
The results of the Hausman’s test indicate that REM is the most appropriate for 
the NC based on ROA for both periods. However, the adjusted R
2
 obtained for the 
period before the revision is approximately 1%, the f-statistics was 1.638 and the p-
value is insignificant. With regards to the period after the revision, the adjusted R
2 
was approximately 10%, the f-statistics was 2.337 and the corresponding p-value 
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was significant (p<0.05) at 5% level. With regards to individual variables, 
Independent committee chair was significant (p<0.01) but negatively related with 
ROA while the remaining variables were insignificant. 
 
Table 5. Multivariate regression based on ROA for both periods 
 REM REM 
Constant  0.068(4.182324)*** 2.824(2.679)*** 
Committee composition -0.002(-0.165) 1.279(1.385) 
CINED -0.000(-0.031) -2.051(-2.867)*** 
Finance expertise -0.008(-0.743) 0.862(0.783) 
Executive experience  0.004(0.239) -0.239(-0.245) 
Executive presence -0.012(-1.258) -0.499(-0.104) 
Firm size -0.830(-1.892)* 21.167(1.469) 
Leverage  0.000(0.845) -10.757(-2.747) 
Year dummy -0.005(-1.122) 0.089(0.308) 
Year dummy -0.001(-0.321) 6.87E-05(0.000) 
R-squared 0.087 0.173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.099 
F-statistic 1.080 2.337** 
    Durbin-Watson stat 1.638 2.268 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5.5. Multivariate regression based on Tobin’s Q 
The results of the regression analysis presented for both periods are based on 
FEM as suggested by the results of the Hausman’s test. The adjusted R2 obtained 
was 47% and 64% for the period before and after respectively, the f-statistics is 
3.218 and 5.148 and the corresponding p-value was significant or lower than the 
alpha value of 0.05. Membership of executive on NC is significant (p<0.05) and 
positively related with firm performance in the period before the revision while the 
remaining variables were insignificant. In the period after the revision, only finance 
expertise is significant (p<0.05) but negatively related with firm performance while 
the remaining variables were insignificant. 
 
Table 6. Multivariate regression for NC based on Tobin’s Q for the two periods 
 FEM FEM 
Constant  0.005(2.495)*** 0.008(2.545)** 
Committee composition  0.001(0.794) -0.001(-0.463) 
CINED  0.000(0.638) 0.001(0.940) 
Finance expertize -0.000(-0.107) -0.008(-2.225)** 
Executive experience  0.000(0.275) 0.005(1.440) 
Executive presence  0.002(2.291)** -0.018(-1.154) 
Firm size  0.065(1.136) -0.005(-0.133) 
Leverage -3.56E(-0.179) -0.006(-0.596) 
Year dummies -0.000(-1.797)* 0.001(2.114)** 
Year dummies -0.000(-1.201) 0.001(1.921)* 
R-squared 0.690 0.800 
Adjusted R-squared 0.475 0.645 
F-statistic 3.218*** 5.148*** 
    Durbin-Watson stat 2.178 2.784 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
5.6. Additional analysis 
To address issues related to the endogeneity of corporate governance variables, 
we usedgeneralized method of moments using lagged values of explanatory 
variables as instruments and re-estimate the model based on both measures of 
performance. With regards to the coefficient of the individual variables, the 
coefficient of committee composition has remained insignificant but changed from 
negative to positive under both measures of performance. The coefficient of 
independent committee chair has become significant under ROA while executive 
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experiencehas become significant under Tobin’s Q but remained in the same 
direction.  
Executive membership has changed from positive to negative under Tobin’s Q 
but remained insignificant, firm size has become significant under ROA and 
insignificant under Tobin’s q but remained in the same direction while leverage has 
changed from insignificant to statistically significant under Tobin’s Q but remained 
in the same direction. Overall the results based on GMM indicate that our results 
based on least squares model are robust to potential endogeneity problem. Finally, 
the result from sargan test indicates that our instruments are valid. 
 
Table 7. Summary of regression based on generalized method of moments 
 ROA(REM) Tobin’s Q ROA(GMM) TQ(GMM) 
Constant  0.033(2.770)***  0.007(5.024)***  0.038(3.624)*** -0.200(-1.334) 
CC -0.008(-0.721) -0.001(-0.866)  0.009(0.986)  0.000(0.058) 
CINED -0.011(-1.437) -0.000(-0.379) -0.022(-3.707)*** -0.000(-0.607) 
FE  0.031(1.946)*  0.001(0.798)  0.018(1.825)*  0.000(0.141) 
EE -0.001(-0.178) -0.001(-1.227) -0.000(-0.121) -0.005(-1.73)* 
EP -0.077(-2.824)***  9.71(0.017) -0.078(-1.704)* -0.008(-1.252) 
FS  0.161(0.980)  0.040(1.743)*  0.311(1.679)*  0.006(0.377) 
LEV -0.168(-3.341)*** -0.008(-1.279) -0.201(-5.086)*** -0.005(-1.69)* 
2008  0.014(2.850)***  4.29(0.0457)   
2009 -0.001(-0.315)  0.002(4.020)*** -0.005(-0.991) -0.000(-1.206) 
2010  0.000(0.217)  0.001(1.529) -0.006(-1.051) -0.000(-1.260) 
2011  0.001(0.419)  0.001(1.506) -0.008(-1.359) -0.001(-1.952)* 
R2  0.189  0.152   
Adjusted R2  0.137 0.090   
F-statistics 3.654*** 2.479***   
DW statistics 8.412(0.675) 1.545   
J-statistics   4.767(0.028) 6.890(0.228) 
Wald test    31.585***  107.525*** 
Notes: ROA=return on assets, CC=committee composition, CINED=chair independent non-executive 
director, FE=finance expertise, EE=executive experience, EP=membership of executive on NC, 
FS=firm size, LEV=leverage, DW= Durbin Watson statistics. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper examined the impact of NC attributes on the performance of finance 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results indicate that directors with finance 
expertise significantly influence accounting returns while executive membership of 
NC affects accounting returns negatively. The result implies that companies that 
want to enhance their profitability should appoint directors with finance expertise 
on NC. Therefore, companies should consider including directors with finance 
expertise on NC while the regulators should consider recommending companies to 
include finance experts in their NCs. In addition, the result shows that membership 
of executive on nomination committee may not be appropriate for companies 
seeking to increase their accounting performance. Thus, this implies that the 
recommendation included inthe Central Bank corporate governance guide which 
requires NC to be composed of non-executive directors is appropriate for finance 
companies.  
The findings contribute to literature and our understanding of the influence of 
nomination committee attributes such as independence, expertise and experience of 
the directors on the committee by showing an association between directors’ 
expertise, independence and positivefirm performance. Management and board of 
companies may use the findings to make appropriate choices about nomination 
committee attributes and governance mechanisms to improve performance 
particularly with regards to expertise of directors. In addition, the evidence will 
assist directors in structuring the nomination committee in a way that enhance its 
effectiveness and contribute to the performance of the finance company. Investors 
may find the evidence useful in understanding Malaysian finance firms in terms of 
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their governance and make appropriate investment decisions. The findings could be 
useful to regulators in other jurisdiction who are looking at ways to enhance the 
effectiveness of nomination committee, overall firm governance and enhance 
investors’ confidence in the firms. The study is limited to listed finance companies 
in Malaysia; future studies could examine the impact of nomination committee 
attributes on the performance of unlisted companies, companies in other sectors 
and economies. Future studies could examine other committee attributes such as 
size, individual characteristics of the directors on the committee and the internal 
processes of the committee.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for the period before revision to MCCG 
 Composition CINED Finance expertise Executive experience Executive presence 
 Mean  0.277  0.576  0.381  0.047  0.3704 
 Median  0.333  1.00  0.333  0.00  0.333 
 Maximum  1.000  1.00 1.00  0.666  1.00 
 Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  0.208  0.496  0.395  0.156  0.396 
 Skewness  0.029 -0.309  0.608  3.182  0.492 
 Kurtosis  2.650  1.096  2.173  11.62  1.703 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for the period after the revision to MCCG 
 INED CINED  FE EE EP 
 Mean  0.6424  0.8090  0.2796  0.2806  0.0072 
 Median  0.6666  1.00  0.2000  0.2000  0.00 
 Maximum  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.1000 
 Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  0.3153  0.3948  0.2613  0.2998  0.0376 
 Skewness -0.9002 -1.5729  0.6221  0.7493  4.9535 
 Kurtosis  2.9828  3.4740  2.4846  2.3697  25.537 
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